MESSAGE TO VLADIMIR PUTIN


WHAT I WOULD SUGGEST TO VLADIMIR PUTIN, ASSUMING I COULD TALK TO HIM, WHAT WILL NEVER HAPPEN. Franco Puglia

You jumped into big mass with Ukrainian invasion: things have not gone as expected.
The point, now, is how to get out of the mass. Non so easy, nor painless.
Let’s start from the beginning, from the idea which is beyond this war: to unify the slave population, weak, as individual nations, potentially strong if unified.
This concept is not new: it comes from all ancient empire dreams, since thousand of years, with the eaegyptiankingdom, with the Chinese Ming kingdom, ad there after.
Back to Russia, history tells us about the extensive dominations of the Russian kingdom from czar Ivan and the other kings after him, continued with the communist revolution and URSS. After that the disaggregation.

The idea of a slave union is not wrong, in itself, but doesn’t not takes into account the different historical period to take place. Back to Ucraina, for example, it is true that the resident population is Russian like: one might say, however, that the Russian population is ucrainaa like. The languages are non dramatically different, the physical aspect of the people is pretty similar. However they are different.
It happens everywhere, included Italy: one nation, with different people, and which are the differences is hard to say. Being a single nation is a rusultaof the history, not a free choice of the people. This was acceptable, many years ago; not now any more.

What might have led to a good result many years ago is resulting a disaster now days: ucraini people did not welcome Russians into their country: their answer was a strong fight, and it’ woldd be a mistake to imagine this be due to the fascination of Zelensky or to the pressure of Nazi troops. The whole people, with few exceptions, has reacted without being forced to do it. Why?

The reason is that people, now days, all over the world, tend tio disaggregation, rather then to aggregation, and the European Union is a demonstration of this tendency: it’s foundation was aimed to a big union of the European populations, to build a strong Europe.
This resulahas been achieved in a very little part, because the sentiment of the different populations drive them out, rather then into the Union. British people decided to leave ad many political organizations in Europe were willing to follow the same direction, until now.

You stopped all of a sudden this European aim starting the Ukrainian war. All European countries have overcome their divisions, unified by a single aim of defence against the Russian aggression to Ucraina. Also in this case you did not expect such a reaction.
These facts should suggest a conclusion: there is little space for unification of people, nowdayss, and any strategy aimed to unification must adopt different methods to reach the objective. The military option is not the most suitable one, as Ukrainian has shown.

We have to learn observing others, if any, adopting more successful strategies.
One is China. China is a completely different world then Europe or America.
Their old culture is deep-rooted in the Chinese soul and orients all their strategies.
China, nowdayss, does not need to even imagine any military war, unless for defence, and with Taiwan exception where, however, they never tried to make a military strike.
Chinese use a soft approach to set up a strong influence on territories where they have economic interest to pursue.

On the other hand it is not so different from the approach that Russia has followed so far in Europe, leading to becoming the main supplier of energy resources in important countries as Germany and Italy, plus others. And the European aim to Russia was pretty open and favourable, even if a residual non confidence, determined by the recent past, was still there, and the military approach to Ucraina has pushed back this confidence to the URSS period of the so called cool war. We all lost many years of progress on the sole route that makes sense, in perspective, for all of us: the unification of Europe, of a BIG Europe, from the Atlantic sea to the Urals mountains, which are the natural border of the European continent.

Why a big Europe? To counterbalance the big China and India, the asean continent, with a population exceeding by far the whole European population including Russia.
Russia is, by historical reasons, in a difficult geographical condition, covering territories spacing from Europe to Asia, as long as the Bering sea.
If no serious conflict has occurred so far between Russia and China for the northern regions of Asia is mainly due to the climatic conditions of those regions, which are not attractive for leaving, but with the increasing population in the planet, that exceed now 8 billions of humans, even those regions might become attractive for China.

The recent strong alliance between Russia and China is a tactical solution for both parties, but it is a weak liaison, considering the population ratio, one to ten, between Russians and Chinese. It cannot last much long, or Russia will become a slave of China in practical facts.
Even Europe and the USA are considering to get more freedom from the Chinese economical penetration, a soft invasion that has made disappearing many industrial activities in the western countries, producing slow of the internal income and slow down of occupation.

In this scenery, what to do about Ucraina?

This war is a great net loss for Russians and Europeans, not talking of Ucraina that has been much destroyed and needs to be rebuilt, either at Russian or European expenses, or both. At present the sole winner in this game are the USA, which are not touched by the war in their own territory nor they are touched by the energy lack and price. Winner because their economy will receive a great impulse in all activities correlated to the war, being a designer and producers of any king of military stuff. And they have now clients (NATO and not NATO countries) that will spend a lot of many to improve their military stuff as a deterrent against Russia, having become, all of a sudden, the public enemy for much of the world, in terms of number of nations, if not in terms of net population.
This is a defeat for Russia, whatever be the results onto the military ground.

At the best, based on what we can see, Russia could join the land from Rostov to Odessa under its’ control, closing any access to the Black see to Ucraina, and controlling that side of the black sea, face to face with Turkey. A very dangerous face to face, either because Turkey still belongs to NATO, either because they are Turkish and Muslim.
And such a result does it shorten the distance between the present and the initial goal you had in mind? Absolutely not: the opposite. Hence it would be a defeat.

Let’s now divide the Russian interests from your personal interests: in case the result of the war be the one described above, and it is not yet achieved, Russia will keep being isolated from much of the world, with their economy on ground and no measurable advantage from the control of the northern side of the Black Sea, while facing hostile territories at its borders.
You will keep your present power in the Kremlin, keeping on watching your shoulders to avoid being fired by internal opposition. Before or later History will describe Vladimir Putin as the man who turned back the destiny of Russia and Europe, producing the death of several tens of thousand of people, either Russians or ucraini.. You will find your place in the black book of the History, among others.

Or …. Or you overturn the cards on the table. How?

You have to admit that this war has been a mistake. Difficult to say that, now, more difficult or impossible tomorrow. If the conditions of the conflict become worse for Russia, this statement will appear as a public declaration of defeat. Even now it appears as a possibility, but you do not have another chance, in my opinion. It must be done, as soon as possible.
How to turn a defeat into a new perspective of success:

1. Get back to the original aim of the war, that you did not want to name as such, calling it as a “special operation”. It’s time now to explain to winch goal this operation was aimed.

a) to join the two souls of the major eastern Russian territories into a single great nation, from the Baltic to the Black sea, based onto information collected by the Intelligence, reporting that people in Ucraina were oriented to welcome this vision, also based onto the news coming from the south-east part of Ucraina, Don bass, where people were killing each other in absence of any successful undertaking of the Ukrainian government to establish a peaceful condition in the region.

b) to show to the slave territories west of Russia that a new unification of all people belonging to the slave etnia was possible, in view of an overall European unification where the role and political weight of these people become much more important the now, with the prominence of the elder states of Europe, like Germany, France, Spain and Italy.

2. Now the difficult statement: people in Ucraina did not appear to be as described by the Russian Intelligence. As a proof, you asked to the Russian military forces not to send in Ucraina their best professionals, but young soldiers with little experience, to test on ground what military operations are, with the minimum risk.

The result has been dramatic, with so many young Russian lives destroyed. But the boots where on ground, at this point, and the generals did not see any other option that keeping on. In few weeks the scenery has become very far from the one expected, and the initial goal of this operation disappeared, or even worse, produced effects opposite to the objectives.

3. At this point you state your decision to resign, underlining that the final objective of this unfortunate conflict remains valid, but has to be pursued following a different approach. Leave the command to somebody that appears the most welcome from the adverse parties, Ucraina and the others, to negotiate the stop of the conflict, bringing back the Russian troupes to Russia and trying to negotiate the reset of the international cooperation as before the war. After the new course you might keep in diffusing your story telling of the enlarged European unification, tailoring for you a new international role.
I can’t say if this will work, but it’s the only escape I see to safeguard your life and image.

Not doing that brings straight to the hell.

Ing. Franco Puglia

4 April 2022

PERCHE’ PAGARE IN RUBLI?

Il dittatore russo chiede ai paesi NON amici di pagare in rubli le forniture di gas, invece che in $ o €. La risposta è stata NO. Ma cosa cambierebbe per gli uni e per gli altri?

1. In genere i paesi fornitori di materie prime preferiscono essere pagati in $, o comunque in valute con le quali possono effettuare acquisti all’estero, per approvvigionarsi di quello che non producono direttamente. Oggi, però, i Russi hanno difficoltà ad acquistare all’estero qualsiasi cosa, almeno dai paesi NON amici, a causa delle sanzioni applicate.
Quindi i $ in eccesso resterebbero congelati nelle banche russe, e non solo: siccome i trasferimenti di denaro, oggi, sono virtuali, non cartacei, e sono cessioni di credito e di debito, in pratica ricevere $ nella banca russa X da parte di una banca europea Y significa che la banca X vanta un credito spendibile di N$ dalla banca Y (più o meno).

In pratica si tratta di scritture contabili, che hanno un valore sino a quando gli viene riconosciuto. Oggi, però, i crediti all’estero di molti cittadini russi sono congelati, quindi … Ecco che ricevere Rubli in pagamento del gas ha quindi un vantaggio per i russi:
a) La banca europea Y deve comperare rubli sul mercato finanziario, in cambio di $ o €, trasferiti alla banca Z che può essere chiunque, anche una banca cinese, ad esempio.
b) Si crea una forte domanda di rubli, cosa che ne fa salire il valore di mercato, cosa puntualmente accaduta alla sola notizia di questa decisione di Putin, con il rublo che è passato da un massimo di circa 140 R/$ nel mese di Marzo agli attuali 83,5 R/$ (valeva attorno a 75 R/$ nel 2020-2021).
c) Un rublo forte facilita gli acquisti all’estero, dai paesi “amici” ed alleggerisce i disagi della popolazione russa.

Peccato che l’Europa abbia risposto picche, affermando che trasferirà € o $ sulla banca di Gazprom, e che sarà poi questa a convertirli in Rubli. Significa che la banca russa dovrà acquistare Rubli sul mercato finanziario, pagando in € o $. Il risultato non dovrebbe cambiare, se una o più banche russe ricercano Rubli sul mercato finanziario estero, pagando in € o $. E per l’Europa non cambia nulla.

2. Ma prima come andavano le cose? L’Europa, ed altri, acquistavano le materie prime russe pagandole, poniamo, in $. Quindi le banche russe accumulavano ingenti capitali in $, con i quali potevano pagare le importazioni dall’Europa, dagli USA ed ovunque nel mondo.
Il valore di cambio del Rublo era determinato dagli equilibri negli scambi, tra i quali anche quelli con i paesi confinanti, sotto l’influenza commerciale russa. La guerra ha turbato questi equilibri, e quindi anche le transazioni economiche ed il valore della moneta russa.
Se il circolante in Rubli fosse stato troppo basso rispetto alle necessità di mercato la banca centrale russa poteva immettere liquidità riequilibrando il cambio, senza determinare inflazione.
Se invece lo facesse adesso, determinerebbe un fattore aggiuntivo alla precedente svalutazione del Rublo, con effetti disastrosi sul potere d’acquisto dei Russi.

In sostanza mi pare sia stata una mossa intelligente, date le condizioni, anche se ha dei limiti: infatti rastrellare Rubli sul mercato finanziario spingerà, si, il valore del Rublo verso l’alto, ciò che è un bene solo entro certi limiti, e la banca centrale russa dovrà riequilibrare immettendo in circolazione rubli “freschi” . Con il passare del tempo si verrà a creare una immane massa circolante di Rubli che non ha un corrispettivo nello sviluppo economico russo e potrebbe determinare una bolla finanziaria dagli effetti disastrosi.
Una valuta vale qualcosa sino a quando ci credi: se perde credibilità è carta straccia.

Ing. Franco Puglia
1 Aprile 2022