RIFLESSIONI DI STRATEGIA POLITICA E MILITARE

La guerra in Ucraina stimola alcune riflessioni sui modi in cui questa guerra è iniziata ed è stata condotta, essendo tutt’ora in corso.
Per formulare delle riflessioni approfondite servirebbe una conoscenza dettagliata dei movimenti sul campo e delle risorse militari impiegate, quindi la mia riflessione ha limiti oggettivi e si rivolge ad elementi di carattere generale, quelli più visibili.

Una prima osservazione riguarda la Russia: dai movimenti sul campo appare molto confusa la strategia militare complessiva, frutto, è stato detto, di informazioni del controspionaggio inesatte, che hanno prima orientato l’offensiva verso Kiev e poi hanno dovuto dirottarla verso sud-est, in quella che, in apparenza, era la materia del contendere sin dal 2014.
Una seconda osservazione riguarda l’impiego massiccio di missili, piuttosto che di bombardamenti aerei, almeno stando a quanto si capisce dai Media, con il vantaggio di non rischiare la perdita di piloti abbattuti dalla contraerea ucraina. Peccato che i missili, a quanto pare, fossero molto più imprecisi di aerei con pilota umano nel raggiungere obiettivi di ordine militare, colpendo spesso, invece, abitazioni civili, ospedali, ecc. A meno che questo non fosse VOLUTO, per piegare la resistenza umana dei civili, più che delle forze armate ucraine.

E per quanto riguarda gli Ucraini? La resistenza armata ucraina pare essere stata molto puntuale, colpendo le forze di terra russe laddove avanzavano, e mettendo in atto una resistenza ad oltranza all’interno delle città che i Russi cercavano di occupare poco alla volta.
Questo modus operandi da entrambe le parti ha prodotto perdite umane ingenti e distruzione di infrastrutture civili oltre che industriali.
Questa strategia di resistenza ad oltranza prosegue anche nel Donbass, e non riesce a fermare la pur lenta progressione russa.

Ma è questo il modo di resistere ad un’invasione armata? La Storia, mi pare, racconta altro. Ci racconta anche delle guerre in cui i rispettivi eserciti si affrontavano schierati e compatti gli uni contro gli altri, producendo massacri feroci, con lo sterminio delle forze avversarie, se in minoranza numerica. Una tecnica progressivamente abbandonata in secoli più recenti, anche grazie all’impiego di armi diverse e più idonee a scontri a distanza e non corpo a corpo.
Ma ci racconta anche di grandi strateghi che usarono l’intelligenza per sconfiggere il nemico, anche soverchiante, adottando tattiche più articolate dello scontro frontale o della resistenza ad oltranza.

Se il nemico è più forte di te, a cosa serve affrontarlo di fronte?
A soccombere. In guerra contano altre cose:
– la sorpresa, difficile, con i satelliti che ti spiano, ma non impossibile
– l’aggressione alle retrovie, colpendo ai fianchi, non di fronte
– il taglio dei rifornimenti, bloccando le retrovie, più che contrastare l’avanzata.

Quando i russi marciarono su Kiev si aspettavano di non incontrare resistenza. Così avrebbe dovuto essere; invece di contrastare l’avanzata, gli Ucraini avrebbero potuto lasciarla progredire spedita, per poi attaccare i Russi alle spalle ed ai fianchi.
I Russi sconfissero Napoleone prima ed Hitler poi, ritirandosi all’interno del territorio e sfiancando l’avanzata nemica, per reagire solo in seguito.

Una cosa è certa: se le tue forze sono inferiori non puoi colpire frontalmente. Non è che, invece, gli Ucraini stanno facendo proprio questo? L’Ucraina non è un paese piccolo.
Gli Ucraini hanno cercato di difendere le città invece di abbandonarle attirando i Russi nelle campagne, dietro un esercito in presunta fuga. Avrebbero evitato i bombardamenti sulle città e la loro distruzione. La resistenza dell’acciaieria di Mariupol è servita solo a raderla al suolo, senza impedire la morte o la cattura dei suoi occupanti.
A cosa è servito, quindi, questo sacrificio di vite umane?
A rallentare l’avanzata russa impegnandola su quel fronte?
Si, anche, ma rallentare un’avanzata che non si sa come fermare è come prolungare l’agonia di una morte certa.

Va detto che gli Ucraini speravano in un maggiore e più sollecito invio di armi, e quindi prendere tempo, una strategia che ha senso. Sotto questo profilo è colpevole la risposta occidentale, che è stata lenta ed incerta, fondata sulla speranza che le sanzioni economiche bastassero a fermare i russi, dimostrando con questo mancanza di senso del tempo, quello che serve a rendere questo tipo di risposta efficace. Nel frattempo in Ucraina si moriva, ed ancora si muore.
La paura di una folle risposta nucleare russa ha paralizzato l’Occidente, laddove un NIET detto subito e con convincente durezza avrebbe potuto bloccare subito Mosca, prima ancora che l’invasione iniziasse. Troppe teste al comando, assenza di un decisore unico, lucido e capace, che non poteva essere il solo presidente USA, essendo coinvolta l’Europa, e che comunque Baiden non avrebbe saputo essere.

Scrivere su una tastiera è facile; combattere sul campo è ben altro, ma le strategie si fanno sempre a tavolino.

Ing. Franco Puglia – 19.6.2022

MESSAGE TO VLADIMIR PUTIN


WHAT I WOULD SUGGEST TO VLADIMIR PUTIN, ASSUMING I COULD TALK TO HIM, WHAT WILL NEVER HAPPEN. Franco Puglia

You jumped into big mass with Ukrainian invasion: things have not gone as expected.
The point, now, is how to get out of the mass. Non so easy, nor painless.
Let’s start from the beginning, from the idea which is beyond this war: to unify the slave population, weak, as individual nations, potentially strong if unified.
This concept is not new: it comes from all ancient empire dreams, since thousand of years, with the eaegyptiankingdom, with the Chinese Ming kingdom, ad there after.
Back to Russia, history tells us about the extensive dominations of the Russian kingdom from czar Ivan and the other kings after him, continued with the communist revolution and URSS. After that the disaggregation.

The idea of a slave union is not wrong, in itself, but doesn’t not takes into account the different historical period to take place. Back to Ucraina, for example, it is true that the resident population is Russian like: one might say, however, that the Russian population is ucrainaa like. The languages are non dramatically different, the physical aspect of the people is pretty similar. However they are different.
It happens everywhere, included Italy: one nation, with different people, and which are the differences is hard to say. Being a single nation is a rusultaof the history, not a free choice of the people. This was acceptable, many years ago; not now any more.

What might have led to a good result many years ago is resulting a disaster now days: ucraini people did not welcome Russians into their country: their answer was a strong fight, and it’ woldd be a mistake to imagine this be due to the fascination of Zelensky or to the pressure of Nazi troops. The whole people, with few exceptions, has reacted without being forced to do it. Why?

The reason is that people, now days, all over the world, tend tio disaggregation, rather then to aggregation, and the European Union is a demonstration of this tendency: it’s foundation was aimed to a big union of the European populations, to build a strong Europe.
This resulahas been achieved in a very little part, because the sentiment of the different populations drive them out, rather then into the Union. British people decided to leave ad many political organizations in Europe were willing to follow the same direction, until now.

You stopped all of a sudden this European aim starting the Ukrainian war. All European countries have overcome their divisions, unified by a single aim of defence against the Russian aggression to Ucraina. Also in this case you did not expect such a reaction.
These facts should suggest a conclusion: there is little space for unification of people, nowdayss, and any strategy aimed to unification must adopt different methods to reach the objective. The military option is not the most suitable one, as Ukrainian has shown.

We have to learn observing others, if any, adopting more successful strategies.
One is China. China is a completely different world then Europe or America.
Their old culture is deep-rooted in the Chinese soul and orients all their strategies.
China, nowdayss, does not need to even imagine any military war, unless for defence, and with Taiwan exception where, however, they never tried to make a military strike.
Chinese use a soft approach to set up a strong influence on territories where they have economic interest to pursue.

On the other hand it is not so different from the approach that Russia has followed so far in Europe, leading to becoming the main supplier of energy resources in important countries as Germany and Italy, plus others. And the European aim to Russia was pretty open and favourable, even if a residual non confidence, determined by the recent past, was still there, and the military approach to Ucraina has pushed back this confidence to the URSS period of the so called cool war. We all lost many years of progress on the sole route that makes sense, in perspective, for all of us: the unification of Europe, of a BIG Europe, from the Atlantic sea to the Urals mountains, which are the natural border of the European continent.

Why a big Europe? To counterbalance the big China and India, the asean continent, with a population exceeding by far the whole European population including Russia.
Russia is, by historical reasons, in a difficult geographical condition, covering territories spacing from Europe to Asia, as long as the Bering sea.
If no serious conflict has occurred so far between Russia and China for the northern regions of Asia is mainly due to the climatic conditions of those regions, which are not attractive for leaving, but with the increasing population in the planet, that exceed now 8 billions of humans, even those regions might become attractive for China.

The recent strong alliance between Russia and China is a tactical solution for both parties, but it is a weak liaison, considering the population ratio, one to ten, between Russians and Chinese. It cannot last much long, or Russia will become a slave of China in practical facts.
Even Europe and the USA are considering to get more freedom from the Chinese economical penetration, a soft invasion that has made disappearing many industrial activities in the western countries, producing slow of the internal income and slow down of occupation.

In this scenery, what to do about Ucraina?

This war is a great net loss for Russians and Europeans, not talking of Ucraina that has been much destroyed and needs to be rebuilt, either at Russian or European expenses, or both. At present the sole winner in this game are the USA, which are not touched by the war in their own territory nor they are touched by the energy lack and price. Winner because their economy will receive a great impulse in all activities correlated to the war, being a designer and producers of any king of military stuff. And they have now clients (NATO and not NATO countries) that will spend a lot of many to improve their military stuff as a deterrent against Russia, having become, all of a sudden, the public enemy for much of the world, in terms of number of nations, if not in terms of net population.
This is a defeat for Russia, whatever be the results onto the military ground.

At the best, based on what we can see, Russia could join the land from Rostov to Odessa under its’ control, closing any access to the Black see to Ucraina, and controlling that side of the black sea, face to face with Turkey. A very dangerous face to face, either because Turkey still belongs to NATO, either because they are Turkish and Muslim.
And such a result does it shorten the distance between the present and the initial goal you had in mind? Absolutely not: the opposite. Hence it would be a defeat.

Let’s now divide the Russian interests from your personal interests: in case the result of the war be the one described above, and it is not yet achieved, Russia will keep being isolated from much of the world, with their economy on ground and no measurable advantage from the control of the northern side of the Black Sea, while facing hostile territories at its borders.
You will keep your present power in the Kremlin, keeping on watching your shoulders to avoid being fired by internal opposition. Before or later History will describe Vladimir Putin as the man who turned back the destiny of Russia and Europe, producing the death of several tens of thousand of people, either Russians or ucraini.. You will find your place in the black book of the History, among others.

Or …. Or you overturn the cards on the table. How?

You have to admit that this war has been a mistake. Difficult to say that, now, more difficult or impossible tomorrow. If the conditions of the conflict become worse for Russia, this statement will appear as a public declaration of defeat. Even now it appears as a possibility, but you do not have another chance, in my opinion. It must be done, as soon as possible.
How to turn a defeat into a new perspective of success:

1. Get back to the original aim of the war, that you did not want to name as such, calling it as a “special operation”. It’s time now to explain to winch goal this operation was aimed.

a) to join the two souls of the major eastern Russian territories into a single great nation, from the Baltic to the Black sea, based onto information collected by the Intelligence, reporting that people in Ucraina were oriented to welcome this vision, also based onto the news coming from the south-east part of Ucraina, Don bass, where people were killing each other in absence of any successful undertaking of the Ukrainian government to establish a peaceful condition in the region.

b) to show to the slave territories west of Russia that a new unification of all people belonging to the slave etnia was possible, in view of an overall European unification where the role and political weight of these people become much more important the now, with the prominence of the elder states of Europe, like Germany, France, Spain and Italy.

2. Now the difficult statement: people in Ucraina did not appear to be as described by the Russian Intelligence. As a proof, you asked to the Russian military forces not to send in Ucraina their best professionals, but young soldiers with little experience, to test on ground what military operations are, with the minimum risk.

The result has been dramatic, with so many young Russian lives destroyed. But the boots where on ground, at this point, and the generals did not see any other option that keeping on. In few weeks the scenery has become very far from the one expected, and the initial goal of this operation disappeared, or even worse, produced effects opposite to the objectives.

3. At this point you state your decision to resign, underlining that the final objective of this unfortunate conflict remains valid, but has to be pursued following a different approach. Leave the command to somebody that appears the most welcome from the adverse parties, Ucraina and the others, to negotiate the stop of the conflict, bringing back the Russian troupes to Russia and trying to negotiate the reset of the international cooperation as before the war. After the new course you might keep in diffusing your story telling of the enlarged European unification, tailoring for you a new international role.
I can’t say if this will work, but it’s the only escape I see to safeguard your life and image.

Not doing that brings straight to the hell.

Ing. Franco Puglia

4 April 2022